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Abstract 
 
Although e-commerce provides many benefits to consumers, e.g. convenience, greater choice, lower prices, and 
more information, there are also a number of barriers restricting its growth.  Credit card fraud is currently one of 
the most serious issues in e-commerce, since it makes consumers reluctant to engage in this alternative method of 
shopping.  Secure Electronic Transaction or SET is arguably the most secure method of payment by credit card 
over the Internet, and it was purposely designed to address all potential threats to Internet e-commerce 
transactions.  However, SET has not really taken off; implementation issues appear to be the main factor 
restricting its adoption.  For example, complexity of end-user initialisation, transaction speed, and cost of 
investment all appear to be significant issues.  The intention of this paper is to consider the true nature of the SET 
implementation difficulties and how things might be changed to achieve higher levels of adoption. 
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1 Introduction 
The emergence of e-commerce provides consumers with an alternative method of payment via the Internet.  This 
reduces the effort and time spent in traditional shopping methods [6]. For example, there is no need for consumers to go 
to retail premises in order to purchase goods.  However, this non face-to-face shopping method also enables fraudsters 
to exploit the lack of any built-in user authentication facilities within the Internet to perform illegal operations, such as 
the use of credit card numbers without the consent of the valid cardholder [2]. This threat is accentuated by the fact that 
the Internet also lacks any built in privacy features, which means that otherwise unprotected credit card numbers sent 
across the Internet as part of a transaction are prone to interception. 
 
The credit card is the most common method of payment in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions [20].  In fact, a 
survey of Internet users conducted by Survey.Net (http://www.survey.net) indicates that more than 50% of Internet 
users purchase products or services by credit card.  Therefore, it is inevitable that the security of credit card numbers is 
an issue of serious concern to Internet purchasers.  Many consumers are afraid of submitting their credit card numbers 
via the Internet, and also perceive Internet shopping as the riskiest method of payment [15], [19]. 
 
2 Overview of e-commerce security requirements 
Since e-commerce involves the transfer of a variety of payment-related data over the Internet, there are a number of 
security requirements for the transaction, including confidentiality, integrity, authentication, authorisation, and non-
repudiation [18].  We can summarise these requirements as follows. 
 
Confidentiality – consumer financial information, such as credit card numbers, must not be compromised or 
intercepted by malicious intruders. 
 
Integrity – all sensitive information transmitted in e-commerce transactions must remain accurate and not be 
modifiable. 
 
Authentication – e-commerce end-users (consumers and merchants) must be able to verify each others' identities. 
 
Authorisation – consumers and merchants must have appropriate authorisations for the e-commerce transaction. 
 
Non-repudiation – consumers and merchants must not be able to repudiate a properly conducted transaction. 
 3 End-user security requirements 
Consumers would appear to have rather negative perceptions of the security of present-day e-commerce, [15].  
Additionally, some merchants are also reluctant to engage in e-commerce. Consumer and merchant concerns arise for a 
number of reasons, some of which we now consider. 
 
3.1 Lack of authentication for e-commerce participants 
As Internet e-commerce is a non-face-to-face shopping method, identity verification of merchants is a concern to 
potential e-commerce participants.  That is, consumers wish to be assured that the merchant that they are dealing with is 
the genuine party, and not a third party masquerading as a reputable merchant.  Merchants, on the other hand, need to 
verify that the e-consumer is who they claim to be and is not using a borrowed or stolen credit card or credit card 
number to initiate transactions. 
 
3.2 Lack of confidentiality for payment information 
Many consumers are concerned that their credit card numbers will be compromised during data transmission or storage 
when they are participating in e-commerce.  Consumer financial information is potentially an attractive target for 
intruders since, in some circumstances, it can be used to conduct fraudulent transactions.  There is also a risk that the 
compromise of consumer credit card numbers can damage a merchant's reputation, whether or not the compromise is 
the fault of the merchant. 
 
3.3 Privacy requirements 
Many consumers are not only concerned about the confidentiality, but also the privacy of their financial information.  
Since the trustworthiness of merchants is one of the most important issues of concern to potential e-commerce 
consumers, there is a need for consumers' financial information to remain private although it is transmitted to merchant 
web servers.  Merchants also have e-commerce privacy requirements, since they may be reluctant to disclose full details 
of consumer order information to their banks. 
 
There are several tools and techniques that, at least partly, address consumer fears, including SSL/TLS [[8] and SET 
[10]. SET is arguably the most secure method of online payment by credit card, and it limits the access that banks and 
merchants have to sensitive consumer information. However, SET has not really taken off, probably because of 
implementation issues.  The intention of this paper is to further investigate the obstacles to SET adoption. 
 
4 SET and e-commerce 
Since e-commerce allows people to place an order via the Internet, there are also several potential security threats 
associated with it.  Online fraud is arguably an issue of concern to all e-commerce participants, including consumers, 
merchants, and their respective financial institutions. SET, which was invented by Visa (http://www.visa.com) and 
MasterCard (http://www.mastercard.com), is a method to secure entire e-commerce transactions.  SET is arguably able 
to address several categories of fraud in Internet e-commerce transactions. 
 
4.1 Credit card fraud 
SET supports long key lengths for both symmetric and asymmetric encryption, such as triple DES and 1,024-bit RSA, 
[16], [17]. There is thus no risk of credit card numbers being compromised via interception. In addition, even if 
unauthorised access to a merchant web server occurs, the confidentiality of consumer payment information will not be 
endangered since it is encrypted using an acquiring bank public key, i.e. it is not available to the merchant. Thus SET 
can prevent credit card fraud arising from transmission and storage of sensitive data. 
 
4.2 Merchant fraud 
In SET, order and payment information are encrypted separately for specific recipients. That is, merchant public keys 
are used to encrypt order information and acquiring bank public keys are used to encrypt payment information. 
Consumers can thus be assured that their credit card numbers will not be compromised by a fraudulent merchant. 
 
In addition, to prevent merchants modifying payment details, e.g. to increase the value of a sale, as part of SET the 
consumer PC adds a digital signature to all relevant transaction information.  
 
4.3 Consumer fraud 
Since the Internet offers no guarantees about the identity of the originator of a transaction, it is difficult for merchants to 
check whether consumers are using stolen credit card numbers to initiate transactions. In cases where consumers use a 
stolen credit card to initiate e-commerce transactions, merchants are responsible for ‘card not present’ transaction 
charge backs, [12], [20]. In SET, consumers must authenticate themselves to their local PC by entering a password to 
activate their digital wallet prior to initiating a transaction [16].  The consumer' s PC then transmits completed order 
form and payment instructions to the merchant.  As SET employs digital signatures to authenticate the cardholder PC, 
merchants can verify the legitimacy of the cardholder.  This means that the SET scheme can address consumer fraud 
deriving from misuse of credit card numbers. 
 
4.4 Internet fraud 
The Internet link between customer and merchant may be subject to manipulation by a malicious third party.  The use 
by SET of digital signatures, as mentioned in Section 3.2, prevents this.  
 
5 Criticisms of SET 
SET has not really taken off probably primarily because of implementation issues, including low transaction speed, 
complexity, inflexibility, etc. [15].  Figure 1 analyses causes and effects when implementing SET. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Causes and effects on SET/EMV implementation 
 
We now focus on possible reasons for these criticisms of SET. 
 
5.1 Getting the right balance 
Consumer confidence in e-commerce is arguably a key enabler to its growth.  However, recent research indicates that 
consumers are very concerned about the security of their financial information when making e-commerce transactions 
[1], [14]. However, it is an oversimplification to suppose that security should be considered as an overriding issue for 
the typical user. For many users, a high level of security may not be important; instead providing security at an 
acceptable level in a less complex way may better meet end-user requirements.  The SET developers have designed a 
very effective security system for e-commerce transactions, but have ignored other important factors.  Although a high 
level of security is necessary where sensitive information, such as credit card numbers, is at risk, other issues, such as 
ease of use and speed of transactions, are also critical to the end user. This means that developers of e-commerce 
security systems need to consider ease of implementation and use for e-commerce end-users instead of just providing 
the highest possible level of protection. 
 
5.2 Lack of end-user participation 
It is generally recognised that end-users should play a significant role in the development of new systems.  According to 
Viega et al. [9, p33], “The lack of communication causes developers to make assumptions about the 
implementation…developers may not have precise knowledge about the environment in which their code will run”.  
Given the complexity of end-user initialisation it is reasonable to assume that there was little or no end-user 
participation in the development of SET before it was issued to the public. As a result, the SET developers may well 
have focussed on the end-user security requirements rather than how the system can be readily implemented and 
operated by end-users. 
 
In order to ensure that the system meets end-user requirements, the developer must involve end-users in the system 
design process.  Prototyping, for example, is one of several software development approaches that facilitates the desired 
interactions between developers and end-users [3], [11]. 
 
5.3 Lack of understanding of consumer Internet skills 
Since there are numerous Internet users who may potentially place an order through the Internet, the level of skill of the 
majority of Internet users is a vitally important factor when designing a payment security scheme. 
 
For the more sophisticated consumers, ordering products via e-commerce may not be difficult.  These users can 
comfortably purchase products or services online. It is reasonable to suppose that such users will understand the 
benefits of e-commerce.  As a consequence, we suppose that the minority of sophisticated Internet users should have no 
problem with registering for a digital certificate and downloading a digital wallet from a SET software supplier. 
 
By contrast, the less sophisticated majority of Internet users may have some difficulty in searching for the items they 
wish to purchase, and in placing an e-commerce order.  Since participating in e-commerce may already be difficult for 
such users, the certificate registration and digital wallet installation processes are likely to pose an insurmountable 
obstacle to use of SET. 
 
Hence, one possible shortcoming in the design and implementation of SET, at least up to the present, is in failing to 
appreciate what it is reasonable to expect of end-users.   Any such system will be doomed to failure if it requires the e-
commerce participant to be an ‘expert user’ in any sense. 
 
5.4 Lack of third party support 
As stated earlier, SET addresses all possible threats that might lead to online credit card fraud.  Although SET 
implementation is complex, SET still seems to be the most appropriate scheme for Internet e-commerce security, given 
that many consumers are still very concerned about the threat of credit card fraud.  However, most e-commerce web 
sites are still using SSL to secure transactions, although SSL was not specifically designed to provide security for 
Internet e-commerce transactions. Indeed, SSL was designed to provide security purely for a communications link, and 
hence fails to address many of the security issues for an e-commerce transaction. So, why is SET not used more widely?  
One reason for the failure of SET to become widely used might be because of inadequate support from governments 
and other third parties. 
 
One way in which the adoption of SET could be facilitated would be if governments or trade bodies positively 
encouraged merchants and card issuers to adopt SET, e.g. by requiring its use for their e-business. Furthermore, 
cooperation with the suppliers of the major Internet browsers, such as Internet Explorer and Netscape Communicator, 
could be used to make SET implementation much easier for consumers.  For example, if the two major Internet 
browsers contained pre-installed digital wallets supporting SET, then the adoption of SET would be greatly simplified.  
Figure 2 gives a diagrammatic representation of SET implementation issues. 
 
 Fig. 2 Reasons behind SET implementation issues 
 
6 Current developments in SET 
Several SET extensions have been invented in order to overcome the existing implementation barriers, such as the so-
called PIN and Chip extensions, [4], [13]. SET/EMV or EMV/SET, which is the integration of SET technology with the 
EMV industry standard for chip cards [7], and 3D SET [5], are current examples of attempts by the SET developers to 
simplify installation and use of SET. We now discuss these two recent developments in more detail. 
 
6.1 SET/EMV or EMV/SET 
SET/EMV was invented in order to reduce the complexity of SET end-user initialisation, but retain SET' s security 
features.  In order to participate in SET/EMV, e-commerce consumers need to possess an EMV-compliant debit/credit 
card and to install a smart card reader at their PC. EMV-compliant Consumer credit cards will communicate with the 
consumer PC via the smart card reader to support the interactions between consumer PC and Merchant Server necessary 
to conduct a SET transaction. In SET/EMV, there is no requirement for e-commerce consumers to register for a public 
key certificate, since the key pair and certificates already contained in the EMV smart card can be used instead. The 
benefits of SET/EMV include the following. 
 
• Consumers can purchase products or services from any PCs that have a smart card reader and the appropriate 
software installed. 
 
• Consumers do not need to worry about threats to their private key, since it is no longer stored at the consumer 
PC. 
 
6.2 3D SET 
3D SET [5], which was proposed by Visa, is an alternative version of the SET scheme that builds upon the relationship 
between three domains in e-commerce transactions, namely the acquirer, issuer, and interoperability domains.  Since 
many of its transaction processes are performed using direct connections between the three domains, 3D SET is able to 
eliminate some of the SET implementation issues, as follows. 
 
Acquirer Domain – The acquirer domain covers the relationship between the merchant and acquirer.  Merchant 
certificates are held in a secure server, which significantly facilitates the payment process. 
 
Issuer Domain – The issuer domain covers the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer.  The cardholder 
payment functionality is implemented on a secure server.  In this case, there is no need for consumers to store 
certificates on their PC, since the Issuer secure server will provide the security functionality. 
 
Interoperability Domain – The relationship between the acquirer and issuer is supported by the interoperability 
domain. 
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Conclusions 
SET is currently the most effective method to secure online transactions since it meets all the main e-commerce security 
requirements.  However, SET has not been widely adopted for a variety of reasons, including implementation issues. 
Nevertheless, given that serious e-commerce security issues remain, SET is still of potentially great value in increasing 
confidence in, and hence adoption of, e-commerce.  Various SET modifications and enhancements, including the so-
called PIN and Chip extensions, have been introduced to try and facilitate implementation and hence increase adoption 
of SET.  Regardless of the success of these enhancements to SET, the developers of SET and of future systems need to 
consider carefully why SET has, at least so far, failed to take off.  If the lessons from these problems are not acted upon, 
then future systems will almost certainly face similar problems. 
 
SET adoption and use would clearly benefit from support from governments and other third parties.  Such support could 
range from regulatory support from governments to inclusion of SET functionality in widely used PC software, such as 
web browsers. At the same time, end users of e-commerce might usefully be encouraged to adopt SET, e.g. by 
emphasising its benefits, offering financial inducements, or simply facilitating the wider use of smart card readers.  
Should SET eventually succeed, it could do much to eliminate existing types of credit card fraud, a benefit to all parties, 
including end users, merchants and banks.  Finally, although SET is widely regarded as being ‘dead’, the fact that 
various modifications to SET, such as the chip extensions, have recently been introduced, as have variants such as 3D 
SET, means that the idea of SET lives on, and it remains likely that some kind of SET-like system will eventually be 
widely adopted. 
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